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I. Introduction 
T HE LAW OF WEAPONRY, which seeks to regulate both the means and the methods of warfare, is one of the oldest and best established areas of 
the laws of war.! It is also widely regarded as one of the least effective. The 
remarkable progress which has been made in the development of weaponry and 
methods of warfare during the twentieth century has been unmatched by 
development in the law. The result is that much of the law and the legal 
literature in this field has a distinctly anachronistic feel. For example, the 
prohibition of weapons causing unnecessary suffering2 was first established over 
a century ago but remains part of the law and was recently applied by the 
International Court of Justice in considering the legality of nuclear weapons.3 
Yet a 1973 survey of the law on weaponry by the United Nations Secretariat 
cited bayonets or lances with barbs, irregular shaped bullets, and projectiles 
filled with glass as examples of weapons considered to be outlawed by the 
unnecessary suffering principle.4 Scarcely standard weapons at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, these were museum pieces by its end. Similarly, leading 
text books refer to the unnecessary suffering principle meaning that "cannons 
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must not be loaded with chain shot, crossbar shot, red,hot balls', and the like."s 
Such examples suggest that the law is firmly rooted in the nineteenth century. 
Yet it would be wrong to write off the law on weaponry as unimportant in 
modem warfare. The twentieth century has seen the adoption of prohibitions on 
, two of the century's most destructive innovations in weaponry-chemical and 
"bacteriological weapons.6 In the closing years of the century, there has been a 
burst of activity, unprecedented in this area since the Hague Peace Conferences 
of 1899 and 1907, which has produced treaties on blinding laser weapons7 and 
anti,personnelland mines,s as well as a treaty which greatly strengthens the ban 
on chemical weapons. In addition, the evolution of customary international law 
regarding the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict has had 
effects on the law of weaponry, while the discussion of the legality of nuclear 
weapons by the International Court of Justice, though inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory in a number of respects, demonstrated that principles established 
in the last century are capable of being applied well into the next.9 Finally, wider 
developments in the laws of armed conflict, in particular the development of the 
law by the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia and the 
negotiations for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, 
have had repercussions for the law on weaponry.tO 
It is therefore a good time at which to take stock of the law relating to 
weaponry and to consider how that law might develop in the early years of the 
new millennium. If that is to be done, however, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of the objectives which the law seeks to achieve in this area and 
the means by which it has sought, so far, to secure them. Among the reasons why 
the law on weaponry is so often seen as ineffective are that its objectives are 
misunderstood and unrealistic expectations are entertained as to what can be 
achieved. The present paper will accordingly begin ,vith a brief account of the 
development of the law (part II) and an analysis of its objectives (Part III). Part 
N will then assess the law of weaponry as it stands at the end of the twentieth 
century. That law does not, however, operate in isolation, and Part V will 
therefore consider the influence of other parts of international law, in particular 
those concerned with the restriction of the resort to force, the protection of 
human rights, and the environment, which may have an impact upon the use of 
weapons in conflicts. Finally, Part VI \vill consider how the law is likely to 
develop in the foreseeable future-and how it might be strengthened. 
II. The Development of the Law Relating to Weaponry 
The prohibition of certain weapons, particularly poisonous weapons, can be 
traced back many centuries. The contemporary law on weapons and the 
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methods of warfare, however, began to develop only in the mid,nineteenth 
century. The Lieber Codell mentioned the prohibition on the use of poison 
and, in its emphasis on the principle of necessity, contained an early, albeit 
implicit, statement of the prohibition of weapons calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering.12 The draft declaration drawn up by the Brussels 
Conference in 187413 and the Oxford Manual prepared by the Institute of 
International Law in 1880 both contained provisions to the effect that a 
belligerent State did not possess an unlimited choice of the methods and means 
of war and prohibited the use of poison, treachery, and weapons causing 
needless suffering.14 It is clear, therefore, that by the late nineteenth century 
there was considerable support for the proposition that international law 
imposed some constraints upon the weaponry which a belligerent might 
employ. . 
The first treaty to that effect was the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, 
which outlawed the employment in hostilities between parties to the 
Declaration of any "projectile of a weight below 400 grammes, which is either 
explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances."ls While the 
specific prohibition introduced by the Declaration is still in force, a more 
important feature of the Declaration is the statement in the Preamble of the 
reasoning behind the specific prohibition, namely: 
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of 
men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly 
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable; [and) 
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of 
humanity. 
It is this statement which provided the first recognition in treaty form of the 
prohibition of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 built upon these 
foundations in a number of agreements. Thus, the Regulations on the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, adopted at the 1907 Conference, 16 provide that "the 
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited" 
(Article 22) and go on to declare that it is "especially forbidden" "to employ 
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arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering" 
(Article 23(e». The Peace Conferences also adopted a number of other treaty 
provisions relating to weaponry and methods of warfare: 
• Hague Declaration No.2, 1899, banning the use of projectiles the sole 
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gasesj17 
• Hague Declaration No.3, 1899, prohibiting the use of bullets which 
expand or flatten easily in the body (especially the so-called soft-headed or 
"dum-dum" bullets)jl8 
• Hague Declaration No.4, 1899, prohibiting for a period of five years the 
launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons and other methods of a 
similar naturej19 
• Hague Regulations, 1907, Article 23 (a), prohibiting the use of poison or 
poisoned weaponsj20 
• Hague Convention No. VIII, 1907, restricting the use of automatic 
submarine contact mines.21 
Subsequent years saw the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Chemical and 
Bacteriological Weapons Protocol, prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, all analogous liquids, materials or devices, and 
bacteriological methods of warfare.22 This prohibition on the use of chemical 
and biological weapons was reinforced many years later by the 1972 
Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, which prohibited the possession of 
bacteriological and toxin weapons,23 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention, which prohibited the possession and use as a means of warfare of 
chemical weapons.24 Neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions,25 nor the two 
Additional Protocols to those Conventions, adopted in 1977,26 deal with 
specific weapons. Additional Protocol I does, however, contain a restatement 
of the principles that belligerents do not have an unlimited right to choose the 
methods and means of warfare and may not employ methods or means of 
warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering,27 and also codifies important 
principles of customary international law regarding the protection of civilian 
life and property which have significant consequences for the freedom of States 
to select the methods and means of warfare.28 In addition, the Protocol 
contains some innovative provisions on the protection of the environment in 
time of armed conflict.29 The protection of the environment was also addressed 
in the 1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any 
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, which 
prohibited the use of weapons intended to change the environment through 
the deliberate manipulation of natural processes.30 
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Finally, a United Nations conference held in 1980 adopted the 1981 United 
Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons, the three original Protocols to which prohibited the 
use of weapons which injured with fragments which cannot be detected by 
(Protocol I) and imposed certain restrictions on the use of mines and 
booby traps (protocol II) and incendiary weapons (Protocol III).31 A 
subsequent review conference in adopted an amended Protocol II on 
mines (which will be superseded for some States by the 1997 Land Mines 
Convention) and a new Protocol IV on laser weapons.32 
III. The Objectives of the Law Relating to Weaponry 
As the law relating to weaponry is a part of the law of armed conflict, it is 
therefore to be expected that its objectives reflect those of the law of armed 
conflict as a whole. The law of armed conflict (or international humanitarian 
law) is primarily concerned with preserving, as far as possible, certain core 
humanitarian values during hostilities. It is not designed to prevent or deter 
States from resorting to force, and the constraints which it imposes must not, 
therefore, be incompatible with the effective conduct of hostilities. Every State 
has an undoubted right of under international law and is entitled 
to use force in order to vindicate that right.33 While the law of armed conflict 
imposes limitations upon what a State may do in the exercise of that right, it is 
not intended to prevent the effective exercise of the right.34 The law of armed 
conflict is thus based upon the assumption that States engaged in an armed 
conflict will necessarily inflict death and injury upon persons and damage to 
property, and seeks to limit these effects by preventing the infliction of 
suffering and damage which is unnecessary because it serves no useful military 
purpose. The law goes beyond that, however, for it requires that, even where 
destruction does have a military purpose, a balance be struck between the 
attainment of that purpose and other values, such as the preservation of 
civilian life; it prohibits the carrying out of an attack when the military benefit 
which may be expected to ensue is outweighed by the damage to those values. 
The principal objective of the law of weaponry is the protection of these 
values. Thus, the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons and methods of 
warfare is designed to serve the objective of distinguishing between civilians 
and civilian objects, on the one hand, and combatants and military objectives, 
on the other, and protecting the former. Similarly, the principle that 
belligerents may not employ weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to 
cause unnecessary suffering serves the objective of pr?tecting even combatants 
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from suffering and death which is not necessary for the achievement of 
legitimate military goals. The principle, which has only recently become a part 
of the law of weaponry, that limits the use of weapons and methods of warfare 
which have a substantial adverse effect upon the natural environmenfs also 
has as its objective the prevention of wanton, unnecessary destruction and the 
balancing of military needs against the value of environmental preservation. 
To that extent, the law of weaponry forms part of an intellectually coherent 
system. The law has, however, also been used to achieve other objectives which 
do not so obviously form part of that system. For example, the prohibition of 
perfidy, which has implications for the choice of methods of warfare (if not the 
weapons themselves), is designed to serve two very different objectives. In part, 
it seeks to preserve core humanitarian values by prohibiting the feigning of 
surrender, protected status, or wounds, because such feints endanger those 
who genuinely seek to surrender, possess protected status, or are wounded, and 
whom the law seeks to protect. The prohibition of perfidy has also, however, 
been used to protect able,bodied combatants from attacks which endanger no 
one else but which are seen as somehow "unfair." The objective there is the 
quite distinct one of preserving certain military or chivalric values. Thus, it is 
easy to see that the prohibition on using the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
emblems as a shield for military operations36 serves a humanitarian objective, 
since abuse of the emblem will endanger genuine medical facilities and 
personnel. On the other hand, the prohibition on making use of the emblems 
or uniforms of an adversary while engaging in attacks or in order to assist 
military operations serves no humanitarian purpose whatsoever; rather, it 
seeks to ensure that one party to a conflict does not treat the other in a way 
which is perceived to be contrary to concepts offair dealing.37 
In addition, the humanitarian objectives of the law of weaponry have 
frequently been intertwined with broader concerns about armaments. Thus, 
the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 was convened in order to discuss 
questions of peaceful settlement of disputes, disarmament, and the laws of war, 
the Russian Government whose initiative had led to the convening of the 
Conference being particularly concerned to ensure that limits were placed on 
the introduction of new weapons and the consequent increases in military 
expenditure which these would entail. In adopting the three declarations 
banning the use of specific weapons,38 the Conference clearly had that 
consideration in mind,39 but was also influenced by humanitarian 
considerations. Each of the three Declarations contained a statement to the 
effect that the Conference had been "inspired by the sentiments" of the 1868 
St. Petersburg Declaration, while the debates reveal that humanitarian 
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considerations were to the fore in the discussions.40 Similarly, the attempts to rid 
the world of chemical and biological weapons which have lasted throughout the 
twentieth century have involved a mixture of humanitarian and disarmament 
considerations, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention being couched very 
much in the form of a disarmament agreement with its ban on possession as well 
as use of chemical weapons and its complex verification system.41 
There is, of course, no reason why humanitarian and disarmament 
considerations should not be combined. The outlawing of a weapon as cruel 
and often indiscriminate as poisonous gas serves the values of disarmament and 
humanity and the employment of disarmament mechanisms for verification 
makes a ban far more effective than a simple prohibition on use. It should, 
however, be borne in mind that the objectives are different. Unlike the law of 
armed conflict, the disarmament process is intended to make war less likely by 
achieving a reduction in armaments, irrespective of whether the particular 
weapons involved are more or less cruel or indiscriminate than others which 
may not be the subject of disarmament negotiations. 
Finally, in considering the objectives which the law of weaponry is designed to 
serve, it is worth remembering that the process by which those objectives have 
been applied has not always been one of strict rationality. Consideration of 
whether a particular weapon or method of warfare causes unnecessary suffering or 
excessive harm to civilians requires a comparison between different weapons and 
methods of warfare. Yet the process of comparison has seldom been a scientific-
or even a particularly informed-one. Deep-seated taboos found in many 
societies regarding certain types of injury or means of inflicting harm have meant 
that certain types of weapon (those employing or causing fire, for example) have 
been treated as particularly horrific, without any serious attempt being made to 
compare their effects with those produced by other weapons. 
Moreover, a mixture of humanitarian and disarmament considerations has 
all too often been used to disguise the pursuit of more self-interested objectives. 
The attempts to ban the crossbow in the twelfth century were the product of 
concern not only with the injuries which a crossbow could inflict but also with 
the way in which this infantry weapon changed the balance of power between 
mounted knights and infantrymen of a far lower social standing.42 Likewise, the 
British proposals eight hundred years later to ban the submarine and the naval 
mine owed more to the threat which those weapons posed to the supremacy of 
the Royal Navy's surface fleet than their challenge to the humanitarian values 
underlying the laws of armed conflict. As Captain (later Admiral) Mahan, one 
of the United States delegates to the 1899 Peace Conference, explained, new 
weapons have always been denounced as barbaricY 
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IV. The Law of Weaponry at the End of the Twentieth Century 
It has already been seen that the law of weaponry consists of general 
principles, such as that prohibiting weapons of a nature to cause unnecessary 
suffering, and a number of rules prohibiting, or limiting the use of, specific 
weapons or methods of warfare. While the relationship between the two is a 
close one, the specific provisions frequently being an extension of one or other 
of the general principles, the differences between them are sufficient to justify 
separate examination here. In particular, the general principles tend to refer to 
the effects produced by the use of weapons or methods of warfare, whereas the 
specific provisions usually concentrate upon the means employed. Section 1 of 
this Part will therefore consider the general principles, while Section 2 will 
examine some of the rules pertaining to specific weapons. Finally, Section 3 will 
consider the case of nuclear weapons. 
Before turning to the general principles, two preliminary matters call for 
comment. First, the law of weaponry-both general and specific-has been 
developed in the context of armed conflicts between States. The treaty 
provisions have usually been applicable only in conflicts between the parties to 
the treaty concerned and even the general principles, which apply as part of 
customary law, have usually been seen as applicable only in international 
armed conflicts. That assumption is now being challenged. As will be seen, 
some of the most recent treaties on specific weapons, noticeably the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the two new agreements on land mines 
(the 1996 Amended Mines Protocol to the Conventional Weapons 
Convention and the 1997 Land Mines Convention) expressly apply to internal 
as well as international armed conflicts.44 In addition, the Appeals Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has held, in its 
decision in Prosecutor v. Taclic Uurisdiction), that the customary international 
law applicable to internal armed conflicts is more extensive than had 
previously been supposed and, in particular, includes the customary rules 
regarding methods and means of warfare which apply in international armed 
conflicts.45 As the Appeals Chamber put it: 
[E]lementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it 
preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts 
between themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their 
own nationals on their own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently 




This aspect of the decision is controversial, not least because the issue of 
methods and means of warfare did not, in fact, arise on the facts of the T adic 
case and there is little evidence of State practice to support the conclusion that 
the rules of customary international law in internal conflicts are as extensive as 
the Appeals Chamber found. The argument of logic is, however, compelling, 
and it is likely that the Tadic precedent will be followed on this point, 
particularly if the International Criminal Court is established and given 
jurisdiction over war crimes committed in internal conflicts. Nevertheless, 
some differences remain between the law of weaponry in international conflicts 
and that applicable in internal conflicts because some of the specific provisions 
on weaponry have not become customary law and, therefore, depend entirely 
upon treaties as the basis for their applicability. 
Secondly, there have sometimes been differences of opinion over whether 
weapons and methods of warfare are lawful unless prohibited (either expressly 
or by necessary implication) or whether one should proceed on the basis that 
the use of at least certain types of weapon is illegal in the absence of a 
permissive rule to the contrary. An element of uncertainty on this question can 
be seen in the Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear 
Weapons case. The Court stated both that international law contained no 
"specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons"47 and that it 
contained no "comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons as such."48 Nevertheless, an examination of the whole 
Opinion demonstrates that the Court did not endorse the argument that 
nuclear weapons carried a general stigma of illegality which rendered their use 
unlawful in the absence of a permissive exception to the general rule. Had the 
Court adopted such an attitude, its finding that there was no rule authorizing 
the use of nuclear weapons would have disposed of the case. By holding that 
international law contained neither a comprehensive prohibition of the use of 
nuclear weapons, nor a specific authorization of their use, all the Court did was 
to hold that the answer to the General Assembly's question had to be sought in 
the application of principles of international law which were not specific to 
nuclear weapons. When the Court came to consider those principles, it looked 
to see whether they prohibited the use of nuclear weapons, not whether they 
authorized such use. In commencing its examination of the law of armed 
conflict, the Court stated that: 
State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does 
not result from an absence of authorization but, on the contrary, is formulated in 
terms of prohibition. 
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The Court must therefore now examine whether there is any prohibition of 
recourse to nuclear weapons as such .... 49 
This approach, rather than that of seeking a permissive rule, certainly accords 
better with State practice in relation to all types of weaponry over an extended 
period. 
(1) The General Principles of the Law of Weaponry 
(a) The Unnecessary Suffering Principle. The most recent statement of this 
principle can be found in Article 35 (2) of Additional Protocol I, which 
provides that: 
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
The principle is a long established part of customary international law which 
can be traced back to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration and to the Hague 
Regulations of 1899 and 1907. As was seen in Part III, the rationale for this 
principle is to be found in the broader principle of necessity in armed conflict, 
which prohibits wanton violence that serves no legitimate military purpose.50 
As well as providing a general yardstick against which all weapons and methods 
of warfare must be judged, the unnecessary suffering principle has provided 
much of the inspiration for agreements on specific weapons, such as those on 
explosive, inflammable and or expanding bullets,51 chemical and 
biological weapons,s2 poison,s3 and weapons which injure with fragments 
which cannot be detected by Some of these agreements go beyond the 
general principle in that they prohibit the use of such weapons even in 
circumstances where their use might not have been a violation of the general 
principle.5s 
The unnecessary suffering principle applies to both the methods and means 
of warfare. It prohibits outright any weapon (or means of warfare) which is of a 
nature to cause unnecessary suffering. In addition, where a particular weapon 
has a legitimate use but is also capable of being used in a way which will, in the 
circumstances, cause unnecessary suffering (and all weapons can be so used), 
the principle prohibits the latter use (or method of warfare) even though it does 
not give rise to an outright ban on the weapon itself. 
The fact that a particular weapon or method of warfare causes severe or 
widespread injuries or death, or inflicts great pain, is not, in itself, sufficient to 
render its use incompatible with the unnecessary suffering principle. That 
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principle does not possess an absolute character; it does not prohibit the use of 
any weapon or method of warfare which causes extreme suffering or extensive 
but only those which cause injuries or suffering that are unnecessary. 
The application of the unnecessary suffering principle thus requires a balancing 
of the military advantage which may result from the use of a weapon with the 
degree of injury and suffering which it is likely to cause. As the Japanese court 
in the case of Shimada v. The State put it, "the use of a certain weapon, great as 
its inhuman result may be, need not be prohibited by international law if it has a 
great military effect."s6 
This balancing act is, however, easier to state in the abstract than it is to 
apply, since one is not comparing like with like and there is considerable 
uncertainty regarding the factors to be placed on each side of the scales. A 1975 
Conference of Experts held at Lucerne which considered this question agreed 
that the principle "involved some sort of equation between, on the one hand, 
the degree ofinjury or suffering inflicted (the humanitarian aspect) and, on the 
other, the degree of necessity underlying the choice of a particular weapon (the 
military aspect),,,S7 but had more difficulty in agreeing on how this should best 
be applied. It is important, therefore, to examine the factors which should be 
taken into account on each side of the equation. 
The Military Aspect. In determining what factors may be taken into account on 
the military side of the equation, the Preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration 
provides a useful starting point.s8 The Declaration is based upon the premise 
that, since the legitimate objective of disabling an enemy combatant could be 
achieved with ordinary rifle ammunition, the "rifle shell" or exploding bullet 
merely exacerbated injury or rendered death inevitable and should therefore be 
prohibited. On the other hand, the high explosive shell, which was far more 
destructive and just as deadly, was excluded from this prohibition because it 
offered a distinct military advantage in that it could disable several combatants 
with one shot or destroy large quantities of property, and thus achieve military 
goals which ordinary rifle ammunition could not. In taking the decision which 
they did, the States represented at the 1868 Conference rejected two factors 
which might have been taken into account on the military side of the equation. 
First, they expressly rejected the argument that since a disabled enemy might 
recover and be able to fight again, the fact that a weapon made death inevitable 
was a legitimate military reason for employing that weapon in preference to 
others. The same reasoning is reflected more than a century later in the ban on 
weapons which injure with fragments that cannot be detected with x,rays. 
Secondly, there was an implicit rejection of the argument that the very savagery 
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of a weapon might be a legitimate military advantage because of the effect 
which it produced upon the morale of enemy combatants.59 
As the first modem attempt to apply the unnecessary suffering principle in a 
specific case, the Declaration remains important. Nevertheless, in at least one 
respect it presents an picture. The suggestion that the legitimate 
objectives of a belligerent can be achieved by disabling the greatest number of 
men overlooks the fact that there are other equally legitimate objectives, such as: 
[T]he destruction or neutralisation of enemy materiel, restriction of movement, 
interdiction oflines of communication, weakening of resources and, last but not 
least, enhancement of the security of friendly forces.60 
It is generally accepted that the weapons needed to achieve such aims differ, 
both in character and effect, from those commonly used against personnel and 
may cause more serious injuries or make death more likely than would typical 
weapons. Nevertheless, their use does not violate the 
unnecessary suffering principle, because the advantages which they offer, in 
terms, for example, of their capacity to destroy materiel, means that this 
additional suffering cannot be characterized as unnecessary.61 
The Humanitarian Aspect. Disagreement also exists about what factors 
should be taken into account on the "suffering" side of the equation. The 
Lucerne Conference considered that 
[T]his comprised such factors as mortality rates, the painfulness or severeness of 
wounds, or the incidence of permanent damage or disfigurement. Some experts 
considered that not only bodily harm but also psychological damage should be 
taken into account. Another expert could not accept such a wide interpretation 
of the concept at issue, as all wartime wounds, no matter how slight, could entail 
severe psychological harm.62 
The present writer considers that the concept of "injury" or "suffering" includes 
the totality of a victim's injury, and that a distinction between physical and 
psychological injuries would be artificial, as well as having no basis in past 
practice concerning weaponry. A more difficult question is whether the effects 
of the victim's injuries upon the society from which he or she comes should be 
taken into account on this side of the equation- for example, the effect upon a 
society of having to cope with large numbers of limbless or blinded former 
combatants would invariably be serious and might well be disastrous. Such 
effects are, however, difficult to quantify and del2end more upon the numbers 
injured than the nature of the injuries in any particular case. 
196 
Christopher Greenwood 
A report published in 1997 by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
attempts to specify more precise criteria for determining whether a particular 
weapon causes unnecessary suffering.63 The approach taken in this Report is to 
study the medical effects of existing weapons, i.e., the degree to which they 
cause death or particular types of injury, and suggest four sets of criteria to be 
used in determining whether a new weapon is one which violates the 
unnecessary suffering principle. 
• Does the weapon foreseeably cause specific disease, specific abnormal 
physiological state, specific abnormal psychological state, specific and 
permanent disability, or specific disfigurement? 
• Does the weapon foreseeably cause a field mortality of more than 25% or 
a hospital mortality of more than 5% (figures substantially in excess of those 
caused by weapons in use at present)? 
• Are the weapons designed to cause particularly large wounds? 
• Does the weapon foreseeably exert effects for which there is no well 
recognized and proven treatment? 
The identification of these criteria and the medical study on which they are 
based is of considerable value in helping to show how the balancing act 
required by the unnecessary suffering principle can be made more precise and 
less anecdotal than at present. It is, however, important to realize that the fact 
that a particular weapon meets one of these criteria is not, in itself, sufficient to 
brand it as unlawful without consideration of the military advantages which 
that weapon may offer. For example, the fact that soldiers cannot take cover 
from a particular type of weapon will, as the report points out, heighten the 
reaction of abhorrence produced by such a weapon.64 But it is also the very 
inability of soldiers to take cover that means that the weapon will, in the 
language of the 1868 Declaration, disable the greatest possible number of 
enemy combatants, and which thus gives it its military effectiveness when 
compared with other weapons. 
Comparison Between Weapons. The essence of the unnecessary suffering 
principle is that it involves a comparison between different weapons in 
determining whether the injuries and suffering caused by a particular weapon 
are necessary. As Dr. Hans Blix has noted, "it is unlawful to use a weapon 
which causes more suffering or injury than another which offers the same or 
similar military advantages."6S The 1868 Declaration was based, as has been 
seen, on precisely such a comparison. In many cases, however, making that 
comparison will be more difficult than might appear from a glance at the 
approach taken in 1868. 
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It is not enough simply to consider the immediate effects of the two weapons 
(or methods of warfare) which are being compared. It may well be the case that 
the one weapon offers the same or similar destructive capability and accuracy 
as another while causing less horrific injuries or a lower level of fatalities. Before 
it is concluded, however, that the use of the latter weapon would therefore 
cause unnecessary suffering, it is necessary to consider a number of other 
factors, in particular the availability (including the expense) of both types of 
weapon and the'logistics of supplying the weapon and its ammunition at the 
place where it is to be used. A particularly important consideration will be the 
extent to which each type of weapon protects the security of the troops which 
employ it, for if the use of the first, more "humane," weapon will lead to 
Significantly higher casualties amongst the force using it, then there is a valid 
military reason for using the second. A belligerent is not obliged to sacrifice 
members of its own armed forces in order to spare the enemy's combatants (as 
opposed to the enemy's civilian population) the effects of the fighting.66 These 
considerations are as much part of the military advantages which the weapon 
offers as the effects which its use produces on the enemy. 
Moreover, it has to be remembered that the degree of choice of weapons 
decreases as one goes down the chain of command. While those who plan or 
decide upon operations at the highest levels of command are likely to have a 
large range of weapons at their disposal and the battle group or task force 
commander retains a significant element of choice, the individual soldier does 
not, as Professor Kalshoven puts it, carry the military equivalent of a bag of golf 
clubs from which he can select the weapon appropriate to each task; usually 
that soldier has no element of choice of weapon at all.67 This consideration is 
likely to be of considerable importance if, which has not hitherto been the case, 
individual servicemen face trial on charges of using illegal weapons. 
The Effect of the Unnecessary Suffering Principle. Although it is the oldest 
principle of the law of weaponry and its continued significance has recently 
been reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice, in practice the 
unnecessary suffering principle has only very limited effects. In particular, it is 
difficult to find a single example of a weapon which has entered into service 
during the twentieth century and which is generally agreed to fall foul of this 
principle. There are several reasons why that is the case. First, if the question is 
whether the weapon itself, as opposed to its use in specific circumstances, 
contravenes the principle, there is disagreement about the test to be applied. 
At the Lucerne Conference, a paper submitted by a British military lawyer 
suggested that the principle would ban a weapon outright only when that 
weapon was "in practice found inevitably to cause injury or suffering 
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disproportionate to its military effectiveness."6S Other experts contested the 
use of the word "inevitably" and argued that it was sufficient if the weapon 
caused such effects in its "normal" use. Article 35 (2) of Additional Protocol I 
speaks of weapons "of a nature" to cause unnecessary suffering. It is doubtful 
whether the use of this formula offers any greater degree of clarity. In practice, 
if it can plausibly be argued that there is a significant range of cases in which a 
weapon can be used without causing unnecessary suffering, the weapon itself is 
unlikely to be regarded as unlawful under this principle. That conclusion is 
confirmed by the paucity of examples of contemporary weapons described in 
the literature as contravening the unnecessary suffering principle.69 The result 
is that the unnecessary suffering principle has generally been more important in 
prohibiting particular uses of weapons (i.e., methods of warfare) than the 
weapons themselves. 
Secondly, as has been seen, the criteria to be employed on both sides of the 
equation in the unnecessary suffering principle are far from clear. Moreover, 
even if the criteria themselves were clearer, it is frequently very difficult when a 
new weapon is developed for anyone outside the circle of those who have been 
responsible for its development to make an informed assessment of the military 
advantages which it offers or the medical effects which its use is likely to 
produce. 
Finally, even when sufficient information about the weapon is available, a 
determination of whether or not its use would violate the unnecessary suffering 
principle requires a balancing of the likely military advantages and the likely 
human suffering which its use in the future will entail, and then a comparison 
between that balance and what would result from the use of alternative 
weapons. It is scarcely surprising that agreement on the outcome of applying 
such a test is seldom achieved. 
(b) The Principle of Discrimination. The second general principle prohibits 
the use of indiscriminate weapons or-which is more important in 
practice-the indiscriminate use of any weapon, irrespective of whether that 
weapon is inherently indiscriminate. This principle is, in fact, a compound of 
three separate principles. First, it is well established in customary international 
law that it is unlawful to direct attacks against the civilian population, 
individual civilians or civilian property. Under the principle of distinction, a 
belligerent is required to distinguish between the enemy's combatants and 
military objectives on the one hand and the civilian population and civilian 
property on the other, and direct his attacks only against the former.7o 
Secondly, even if the target of an attack is a legitimate military objective, the 
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principle of proportionality provides that it is prohibited to proceed with the 
attack if it: 
IMlay be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.?l 
Finally, if there is a choice of the methods or means of attack, there is a 
requirement to take all feasible precautions with a view to avoiding or 
minimizing incidental civilian casualties and damageY 
These principles go primarily to the question of targeting, a matter which 
falls outside the scope of this paper.73 Nevertheless, they also have an effect 
upon the law of weaponry. If a weapon is incapable of being used in a way which 
permits discrimination between military targets and civilians or civilian 
objects, then it is inherently indiscriminate and these principles render it 
unlawful. In practice, very few weapons are so inaccurate that they cannot be 
used in a way which complies with the principles set out in the preceding 
paragraph, although the VI and V2 missiles used by Germany in the Second 
World War probably fell into that category.14 A far more common case of 
conduct prohibited by these principles is the indiscriminate use of a weapon 
which is capable of being used in a discriminating way. Iraq's use of Scud 
missiles during the Gulfhostilities in 1991 is an example.15 
These principles are some of the most important cornerstones of the law of 
armed conflict. They were so widely disregarded during the Second World War 
that it was open to question whether they could still be regarded as part of the 
customary law. Since 1945, however, they have been reaffirmed on a number of 
occasions, most recently in Additional Protocol I, and were applied by, for 
example, the Coalition States in the operations against Iraq in 1991.76 Their 
status as part of the contemporary customary law cannot now be doubted. 
While difficulties in their application remain, Protocol I has resolved a great 
many problems. In particular, it has clarified the principle that attacks must be 
directed only against military objectives by offering a workable definition of a 
military objective and has made clear that in applying the test of 
proportionality, only a "concrete and direct military advantage," rather than a 
nebulous concept such as the effect on enemy morale, is to be weighed against 
the effect of an attack upon the civilian population. 
The principles contain both absolute and relative elements. The principle of 
distinction possesses an absolute character-civilians and civilian objects must 
never knowingly be made the object of attack and care must be taken to ensure 
that any target is, in fact, a legitimate military objective.77 The principle of 
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proportionality, on the other hand, involves a balancing of the military 
advantages to be gained from an attack upon a military target against expected 
civilian losses and damage. As with the principle of unnecessary suffering, if 
those same military advantages can be achieved in different ways, one of which 
involves likely civilian casualties whereas the other does not, then the choice of 
the first route will entail a violation of the principle. However, the same 
qualifications apply here. In determining whether a commander who possesses 
a choice of weapons or methods of warfare should select one rather than the 
other, the extent to which both are truly available to him (in the light of such 
considerations as the likely future calls on precision munitions, the protection 
of his own forces and the logistic questions considered in the previous section) 
must be examined. The difference is that, although the security of his own 
forces remains an important part of this calculation, the need to reduce the risk 
to the civilian population means that a commander may be required to accept a 
higher degree of risk to his own forces. 
Where the proportionality principle differs from the unnecessary suffering 
principle is that it is clearly established that it does not stop at the prohibition of 
unnecessary collateral injury and damage, but also requires a belligerent to 
abstain from an attack altogether, even if that means losing a military 
advantage which cannot be obtained by other means, if the military advantage 
would not be worth the expected civilian casualties and damage. The principle 
of proportionality is thus a more substantial constraint than the unnecessary 
suffering principle. Nevertheless, it remains a requirement to balance military 
gains against civilian losses; it does not possess an absolute character. In this 
respect, the Commentary on Additional Protocol I published by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross is misleading when it says that: 
The idea has been put fonvard that even if they are very high, civilian losses and 
damage may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of great importance. 
This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol. ... The Protocol 
does not provide any justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian 
losses and damage. Incidental losses and damage should never be extensive.78 
What the principle of proportionality (as stated in both customary law and 
the Protocol) prohibits is the causing of excessive civilian losses and damage. By 
substituting the word extensive, the Commentary replaces a term which 
necessarily implies a balance between two competing considerations with a 
term which suggests an absolute ceiling on civilian losses. There is no basis in 
the law for such an approach. 
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The Gulf conflict of 1990,91 demonstrated that the principles which are 
designed to protect the civilian population are workable. That conflict, 
however, also highlighted the fact that the proportionality test today requires 
consideration of a wider range of issues than in the past. In the Gulf conflict, 
Coalition air raids and naval bombardment of military targets appear to have 
caused relatively few direct civilian losses, but the damage done to the Iraqi 
power generating system and other parts of Iraq's infrastructure did far more 
harm to the civilian population. Application of the proportionality test today, 
at least at the strategic level, requires that less immediate damage of this kind 
must also be taken into account, although the difficulty of doing so is apparent. 
The treaty statements of the discrimination principles do not apply to naval 
warfare except in so far as it involves the civilian population on land. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there are restrictions on targeting in naval warfare.79 
In particular, merchant ships are not automatically to be treated as legitimate 
targets unless they engage in certain kinds of behavio'ur. It has therefore been 
suggested in a recent study that the principles of distinction and proportionality 
are applicable, mutatis mutandis, as part of the customary law of naval warfare, 
with consequent implications for the law of weaponry in a naval context.so 
(c) The Prohibition of Perfidy. The principle which prohibits the use of 
perfidy is well established in both customary international law and Additional 
Protocol I. The somewhat mixed objectives which this principle seeks to 
achieve have already been discussed in Part III and little more need be said 
here. There is probably no weapon which is inherently perfidious,81 and the 
principle therefore operates entirely upon the methods of warfare. 
The humanitarian rationale of this principle is concisely set out in Article 
37(1) of Additional Protocol I as "inviting the confidence of an adversary to 
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection 
under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to 
betray that confidence." The provision then goes on to give the following 
examples of perfidy: 
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a 
surrender; 
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; 
(c) the feigning of civilian, non' combatant status; and 
(d) the feigning of status by the use of signs, emblems or 




Article 38 adds a specific prohibition on the improper use of the emblems 
(principally the Red Cross and Red Crescent) of the Geneva Conventions and 
internationally recognized protective emblems, such as the flag of truce, as well 
as any unauthorized use of the United Nations emblem.s2 By contrast, Article 
37 (2) provides that: 
Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to 
mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule 
of intemationallaw applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious 
because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to 
protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of 
camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation. 
As has already been seen, these provisions, which reflect customary 
international law, serve a clear humanitarian objective. The prohibition in 
Article 39(1) of the use by belligere.nts of the flags, emblems, and uniforms of 
neutral States or other States not party to the conflict also serves that 
objective, since it also seeks to protect persons and objects which would not be 
legitimate targets of attack. That 'is not true, however, of the rule in Article 
39(2) which forbids the use of enemy flags and uniforms by a belligerent while 
engaging in an attack or in order to shield, favor, protect, or impede military 
operations. The objective behind the latter rule is quite different and serves no 
obvious humanitarian purpose.S3 
Traditionally, the law on ruses in naval warfare has been different. In naval 
warfare, the use of enemy flags and signals is entirely legitimate up to the point 
at which an attack is commenced.sf There is, therefore, no equivalent of the 
rule in Article 39(2) of Additional Protocol I (which is expressly stated not to 
apply to naval warfare).B5 The principles in Articles 37 and 38 of the Protocol 
are intended to apply to all forms of warfare, but their application to naval 
hostilities necessitates some modification to take account of the different 
conditions of naval warfare. The San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea states the basic principle of perfidy in the 
same terms used in Additional Protocol I, Article 37(1), and adds, as specific 
examples of perfidious behavior: 
... the launching of an attack while feigning: 
(a) exempt, civilian, neutral or protected United Nations status; 
(b) surrender or distress by, e.g., sending a distress signal or by the crew 
taking to life rafts.86 
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This provision was supported by a large group of experts and is in accordance 
with the approach taken in the United States Naval Commander's Handbook.57 
It is open to question, however, whether sub,paragraph (a) reflects customary 
law, since the practice of disguising warships as merchant vessels and the use of 
Q,ships was extensively practised during the Second World War and there is 
no clear practice to the contrary since that date.ss 
The San Remo Manual also states that: 
Ruses of war are permitted. Warships and auxiliary vessels, however, are 
prohibited from launching an attack whilst flying a false flag, and at all times from 
actively simulating the status of: 
(a) hospital ships, small coastal rescue craft or medical transports; 
(b) vessels on humanitarian missions; 
(c) passenger vessels carrying civilian passengers; 
(d) vessels protected by the United Nations flag; 
(e) vessels guaranteed safe conduct by prior agreement between the 
parties, including cartel vessels; 
(f) vessels entitled to be identified by the emblem of the red cross or red 
crescent; or 
(g) vessels engaged in transporting cultural property under special 
protection.89 
(d) The Principle of Environmental Protection. A number of specific rules of 
the law of armed conflict operate, expressly or impliedly, to protect the 
natural environment. Thus, the 1977 Environmental Modification Treaty 
addresses the potential problem of a belligerent seeking to use the 
environment as a means of warfare in itself by prohibiting the use of 
environmental modification techniques which have widespread, 
long,lasting, or severe effects upon the environment.9o This treaty, however, 
deals with the exceptional case of the deliberate manipulation of the 
environment for military purposes, rather than the far more common case of 
environmental damage inflicted in the course of ordinary military operations. 
To some extent, the prohibition of the wanton destruction of property and 
the use of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the restrictions on the 
use of land mines and incendiary weapons indirectly protect the 
environment. T aday, however, it is argued that there is a broader, general 
principle of respect for the environment in time of armed conflict.91 
For States party to Additional Protocol I, such a principle is to be found in 
Article 35(3), which states that: 
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It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment.92 
This provision was, however, an innovation in 1977 and cannot be regarded as 
forming part of customary internationallaw.93 
Nevertheless, there are clear indications that a general principle of 
environmental respect is emerging and may well already form part of customary 
law. Thus, the 1995 edition of the U.S. Commander's Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations stipulates that: 
It is not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural environment during 
an attack upon a legitimate military objective. However, the commander has an 
affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the 
extent that it is practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. To 
that end, and as far as military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare 
should be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the 
natural environment. Destruction of the natural environment not necessitated 
by mission accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited. Therefore, a 
commander should consider the environmental damage which will result from 
an attack on a legitimate military objective as one of the factors during target 
analysis.94 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
the International Court ofJustice stated that: 
States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing 
what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military 
objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to 
assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. 95 
The United Nations General Assembly has expressed similar views.96 While 
the language may be different in each case, the general sense is substantially the 
same.97 
(e) Other General Principles. Before leaving the subject of the general 
principles, it is necessary to consider whether any other general principle may 
have become part of the law of weaponry. There is, of course, the principle that 
the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose the methods and means 
of warfare is not unlimited.98 This principle is not, however, a free-standing 
norm, since it gives no indication what the limitations upon the right to choose 
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might be. It serves only to introduce the limitations, both general and specific, 
laid down elsewhere in the law. 
A more substantial contender is the Martens Clause, which first appeared in 
the Preamble to Hague Convention No. II of 1899. The most recent version of 
this clause appears as Article 1 (2) of Additional Protocol I: 
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience. 
It has sometimes been argued that the use of a particular weapon or method 
of warfare might be unlawful, as a result of the Martens Clause, even though it 
was not outlawed by any of the general principles or specific provisions of the 
law of weaponry.99 According to this approach, a weapon will be unlawful if its 
effects are so contrary to considerations of humanity and the public conscience 
that it arouses widespread revulsion. This view is based upon a 
misunderstanding of the Martens Clause. There is no doubt that one effect of 
the Clause is that the absence of a specific treaty provision does not mean that 
a weapon must be lawful; the Clause makes clear that the general principles 
embodied in customary law still apply and that the use of a weapon contrary to 
those principles will be unlawful. Furthermore, the Martens Clause 
undoubtedly states what has frequently been the motivating force behind the 
adoption of a specific ban (e.g., those on land mines and laser weapons). There 
is no evidence, however, that the use of any weapon has ever been treated by 
the international community as unlawful solely on account of the Martens 
Clause and the Clause should not be regarded as laying down a separate general 
principle for judging the legality of weapons under existing law.loo 
Finally, it can reasonably be said that the undoubted duty to respect the 
territorial integrity of neutral States implies the existence of a general principle 
that the belligerents must abstain from the use of methods and means of 
warfare which cause disproportionate damage to the territory of neutral States. 
This principle has only very limited significance for the use of weapons other 
than nuclear weapons and it is in that context that it will be considered below. 
(2) Rules on Specific Weapons. The evolution of the treaty provisions 
regulating the use of specific weapons has already been outlined in Part II. 
Unlike the general principles of the law of weaponry, these specific provisions 
tend to concentrate upon the means used (e.g., exploding bullets ofless than 
400 grammes weight, laser weapons, chemical weapons), rather than the 
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effects produced (e.g., unnecessary suffering, disproportionate civilian 
casualties). They fall into three broad groups: 
• Limitations on the use of a particular weapon which fall short of an 
outright ban; 
• Bans on the use, but not the possession and, perhaps, not the retaliatory 
use, of a particular weapon; and 
• Bans on both use and possession. 
It is not intended in this paper to try to analyze all of the specific weapons 
provisions. Instead, three categories of weapons-laser weapons, land mines, 
and chemical weapons-which have been the subject of important legal 
changes in the 1990s, and which illustrate the three categories set out above, 
will be examined. 
(a) The Lasers Protocol In October 1995, a Conference was convened 
under the provisions of Article 8(3) of the 1981 Weapons Convention to 
review the scope and operation of the Convention and its three Protocols. One 
of the items on the agenda of the Review Conference was a proposal for the 
adoption of a new protocol to the Weapons Convention to ban the use of 
weapons (a type of weapon not then in common use but 
which it was believed would be widely available before long) on the ground that 
such weapons would cause permanent blindness. This issue had been under 
consideration by the International Committee of the Red Cross for several 
years. 101 It had been argued by some commentators that the use of laser 
weapons to blind enemy combatants was already prohibited by the unnecessary 
suffering principle. 102 That conclusion was challenged, however, by others who 
argued that a blinding weapon could not be regarded as causing unnecessary 
suffering when the alternative weapons could cause death.l03 In fact, the 
arguments are finely balanced and the unnecessary suffering principle probably 
does not outlaw the use of lasers as such, although it might 
prohibit their use in certain circumstances.104 In view of this difference of 
opinion and the uncertainty inherent in the application of the unnecessary 
suffering principle, the opponents of lasers not surprisingly 
decided that it was necessary to seek a specific ban. 
In this case, the approach of seeking to eliminate an entire category of 
weapons was never an option. Lasers are used on the battlefield for a wide range 
of undoubtedly legitimate purposes, including target identification and range 
finding, which would not normally involve injury to eyesight and which States 
were not willing to abandon. In addition, several States distinguished between 
the use oflasers against the human eye and their use against equipment optical 
systems, where there was a risk of incidental injury to the human eye. 
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The new agreement, 105 adopted by the Review Conference as Protocol IV to 
the Weapons Convention, reflects these views. Article 1 prohibits the 
employment of "laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat 
function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to 
unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective 
eyesight devices." The use oflaser weapons which do not have as one of their 
combat functions the causing of permanent blindness to the naked eye is not, 
therefore, prohibited and, if blindness is caused as a collateral consequence of 
the use of such a weapon, or the use of other laser systems such as range finders, 
there will be no violation of the Pro to col. 106 Article 2 of the Protocol, however, 
requires the parties to take all feasible precautions, when using laser systems 
not prohibited by the Protocol, to avoid causing blindness to the unenhanced 
vision of enemy combatants. 
The result is a treaty that bans the use of a fairly narrow category of 
weapons-laser weapons specifically designed to cause blindness. The use of 
other types of laser weapon, even if it results in blindness, remains lawful. At 
the time of writing, the Protocol had not yet entered into force. When it does, it 
will be binding only upon those States parties to the Weapons Convention 
which opt to become bound by Protocol IV. 
(b) Land Mines. Unlike laser weapons, land mines have been the subject of a 
sustained campaign during the 1990s to achieve a total ban. Whereas the 
concern about blinding laser weapons centered on the unnecessary suffering 
principle, the move to ban land mines was motivated more by the effects which 
their use had been shown to have upon the civilian population, often long after 
the conflict. Nevertheless, while the indiscriminate use of land mines was a 
violation of the general principle of distinction, they were also capable oflawful 
use, against military targets or as a means of denying an adversary access to an 
area ofland. 
Protocol II to the Weapons Convention already contained limitations on 
the use ofland mines and booby,traps.l07 So far as mineslO8 were concerned, the 
original Protocol II limited their use in the following ways: 
• By prohibiting their use against civilians and their indiscriminate use 
(Article 3), although this added nothing to the general principles on targeting; 
• By imposing a more specific restriction on the use of mines in centers of 
civilian population where combat was not actually taking place (Article 4); 
• By prohibiting the use of remotely delivered mines unless they are used 
within an area which is itself a military objective and either their location is 
accurately recorded or they are fitted with a self,neutralizing mechanism which 
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will render the mine harmless or destroy it when it no longer serves the military 
purpose for which it was laid (Article 5); and 
• By requiring the recording and publication of the location of minefields 
and co,operation in their removal after a conflict (Articles 7 and 9). 
The provisions of the Protocol are very limited. Only Article 5 imposed a 
substantial limitation and this is "clumsily worded."lo9 Not surprisingly, these 
provisions were widely regarded as insufficient in view of the devastating effects 
of land mines--often continuing for many years after the end of active 
hostilitiesYo A number of States therefore pressed for a complete ban onland 
mines, while others urged the Review Conference to tighten the restrictions in 
Protocol II. 
The first result was the adoption in 1996 of an amended Protocol II111 which 
goes some way towards tightening the restrictions on the use ofland mines and 
increasing the protection of the civilian population. The most important 
changes introduced by the amendments;are as follows: 
• A ban on the use of various devices which make mine clearance more 
dangerous (Article 3 (5) and (6)); 
• A ban on the use of anti,personnel mines which are not detectable, as 
specified in the technical annex to the Protocol (Article 4); 
• Restrictions on the use of mines which do not meet the requirements in 
the technical annex (Article 5). The technical annex requires that mines 
produced after 1 January 1997 must meet certain requirements regarding 
detection and self,neutralization and their location must be carefully recorded; 
• Stricter constraints on the use of remotely delivered mines (Article 6); 
• Stricter rules for the protection of peacekeepers and others not directly 
involved in the conflict (Article 12) and for the protection of civilians (Article 
3(8) to (11)); 
• A more extensive obligation regarding mine clearance after the conflict 
(Articles 10 and 11); and 
• A prohibition on the transfer of mines which do not meet the 
requirements of the Protocol and limitations on the transfer of mines which do 
meet those requirements (Article 8). 
The amended Protocol II is thus considerably more stringent than the original 
Protocol. Whether it will succeed in significantly reducing the threat posed to 
civilians by mines is another matter. One of the biggest threats to civilians is the 
large numbers of old mines, readily available and cheap, which do not meet the 
requirements of the amended Protocol and which are likely to be used by 
untrained personnel. This risk is particularly acute in civil wars; indeed, it is in 
the civil wars in Angola and Cambodia that some of the worst casualties from 
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land mines have been sustained. It is therefore an important development that 
the amended Protocol is expressly applied to internal armed conflicts within 
the meaning of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, where it applies 
both to the government and rebel parties.ll2 Since the other Protocols to the 
Weapons Convention contain no provision on the scope of their application, 
they apply only in the circumstances specified in Article 1 of the Weapons 
Convention itself, namely international armed conflicts, including wars of 
"national liberation" as defined in Article 1 (4) of Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions. It has, however, been suggested, notwithstanding the 
absence of any express provision regarding internal conflicts in the new Protocol 
W, that Protocol was also intended to apply to internal armed conflicts,1l3 
although no trace of such an understanding is to be found in its text. 
The amended Protocol II did not go far enough for a large body of States. 
They aimed instead at a complete ban on the use and transfer of land mines 
and, to that end, adopted a separate treaty in 1997. The United Nations 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti,Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, as its name 
suggests, is a complete ban on the use of anti,personnelland mines.l14 The 
Convention, the Preamble of which echoes the language of the Martens Clause 
and refers specifically to both the unnecessary suffering principle and the 
principle of distinction, goes beyond a ban on the use of anti,personnel mines 
"in all circumstances" and bans their production, stockpiling, and possession, 
as well as the transfer of such mines to others. The definition of an 
anti,personnel mine, however, excludes mines "designed to be detonated by 
the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person," even if 
equipped with anti,handling devices.115 The Convention requires that all 
parties take steps, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to ensure 
implementation of its provisions.u6 While the conclusion of this Convention 
was a triumph for the opponents ofland mines, its effectiveness is likely to be 
limited as a number of major military powers have declined to participate. 
Once the 1997 Convention and the amended Protocol II enter into force, 
there will be a complex network of obligations regarding land mines: 
• States party to the 1997 Convention will be obliged not to employ 
anti,personnelland mines in any circumstances, even in hostilities with States 
not party to the Convention; 
• States party to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention which elect 
to become party to the amended Protocol II will be bound by that Protocol in 
their relations with other States party to the 1980 Convention which have 
accepted that Protocol; 
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• States party to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention which elect 
not to become party to the amended Protocol II will remain bound by the 
original Protocol II in their relations with other parties which have made the 
same choice; and 
• States not party to the 1980 Convention or which have not accepted 
either version of Protocol II will remain subject in dieir use ofland mines only 
to the customary law general principles on unnecessary suffering and 
distinction and other States will be subject to the same regime in their relations 
with such States (unless, of course, they are parties to the 1997 Convention). 
As students of the law will doubtless testify, multiplicity of law making bodies 
has its price. 
(c) Chemical Weapons. By far the most important development in the law of 
weaponry during the last decade of the twentieth century has been the adoption 
in 1993 of a new Chemical Weapons Convention.ll7 The use of chemical 
weapons in warfare had already been prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.118 
That prohibition, however, was incomplete in a number of respects. In 
particular, so many States had entered reservations to the 1925 Protocol, to the 
effect that they retained the right to use chemical weapons if those weapons were 
first used against themselves or their allies, that the Protocol was, in reality, only 
a ban on the first use of such weaponsY9 The use of chemical weapons by Iraq, 
first against Iranian armed forces and later against parts of Iraq's own civilian 
population, during the Iran,Iraq war,120 and the threats by Iraq to use chemical 
weapons during the Kuwait conflict,121 highlighted the weakness of the existing 
legal regime. The prohibition on the use of chemical weapons was reaffirmed by a 
declaration adopted by 149 States at the Paris Conference in January 1989. 
Subsequent negotiations led to the adoption of the new convention in 1993. The 
Convention entered into force in April 1997 . 
The 1993 Convention establishes a legal regime far more extensive than 
that contained in the 1925 Protocol and customary international law. While 
space does not permit a detailed analysis of the provisions of the 1993 
Convention here, 122 three points call for comment. First, the scope of the 1993 
Convention is broader than that of the 1925 Protocol. The range of weapons 
covered by the 1925 Protocol had long been the subject of debate, with the 
United States, and latterly the United Kingdom, arguing that non,lethal riot 
control agents lay outside the scope of the Protocol,l23 an interpretation 
contested by many other States. The new Convention expressly prohibits the 
use of riot control agents "as a method of warfare.,,124 While this prohibition 
still leaves some room for debate about whether a particular use of riot control 
agents (for example, to suppress a riot at a prisoner of war camp or to deal with 
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demonstrators in occupied territory) constitutes their use "as a method of 
warfare," it clearly outlaws the use of riot control agents against enemy forces in 
combat or in bombardment of enemy targets. In addition, the obligation placed 
upon States parties by Article I, paragraph 1, never to use chemical weapons 
"under any circumstances" applies to armed conflicts, as 
well as to conflicts between States.l25 While it had been argued by some States 
and commentators that the prohibition in the 1925 Protocol was also 
applicable to conflicts, 126 the matter was not free from doubt 
and the greater clarity of the new Convention is thus most welcome. 
Secondly, the 1993 Convention prohibits all use of chemical weapons in 
warfare, not just their first use. The obligation never to use chemical weapons 
in any circumstances, contained in Article I, was intended to exclude the 
operation of the doctrine of belligerent reprisals as a justification for employing 
chemical weapons. In addition, Article XXII provides that the Convention is 
not subject to reservations, so that there is no scope for States to become 
parties subject to the kind of reservations which many entered on becoming 
parties to the 1925 Protocol. That does not mean that a State which was the 
victim of a chemical attack in violation of the Convention may not retaliate. 
The Convention prohibits retaliation in kind, in the form of a chemical 
but it does not affect the right of States to retaliate by other 
means. In this context, a particularly important question is whether a State 
could lawfully resort to the use of a nuclear weapon in response to a chemical 
attack. This possibility was considered at some length by Judge Schwebel in his 
dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, where he discussed the threat 
of nuclear retaliation allegedly made by the United States to dissuade Iraq from 
resorting to chemical weapons during the Kuwait conflict.127 In the writer's 
view, the Court's advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case leaves open the 
question whether such a reprisal would be lawfuL 
Finally, the 1993 Convention goes far beyond a prohibition on the use of 
chemical weapons and outlaws their manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling, and 
transfer .128 It also requires States to destroy their existing stocks.129 The 
Convention creates a complex regime of inspection and verification, which 
goes beyond that envisaged by the Land Mines Convention, the object of 
which is to guarantee that chemical weapons are completely eliminated. This 
ambitious project takes the Convention out of the scope of the law of armed 
conflict and into the realm of arms controL It remains to be seen whether some 
of the doubts expressed about the effectiveness of this regime can be overcome 
and the goal of the Convention attained. 
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(3) Nuclear Weapons. 130 Nuclear weapons merit separate consideration, both 
because of their inherent importance and because of the intensity of the debate 
about whether their use could ever be compatible with the law of weaponry. 
Those who argue that it could not have tended to base their case on one or 
more of three propositions. 
• That there exists in international law a specific prohibition of the use of 
nuclear weapons. Since there is evidently no treaty of general application 
containing such a prohibition, this argument is based upon a series of 
resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly over the years; 131 
• That one of the other specific prohibitions applies directly, or by analogy, 
to nuclear weapons. The prohibitions on which reliance is usually placed being 
those on chemical weapons and poisoned weapons; and 
• That any use of nuclear weapons would inevitably violate one or more of 
the general principles of the law of weaponry. 
These arguments have been fully canvassed both in the literature132 and in the 
submissions of certain States to the International Court of Justice in the 
proceedings on the request for an Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 133 
Those who take a contrary view do not, for the most part, deny that the law 
of weaponry is applicable to nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is striking that none of 
the which made submissions to the Internatiol'lal Court 
of Justice took such a position.134 The only respect in which the law of 
weaponry does not apply to nuclear weapons is that the innovative provisions 
introduced by Additional Protocol I were adopted on the understanding that 
they would not apply to the use of nuclear weapons.13S They maintain, 
however, that there is no specific prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in 
international law, that the prohibitions on chemical weapons and poison do 
not extend to nuclear weapons, and that it is possible to envisage 
circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used without violating the 
general principles. 
In some respects, the Court's Advisory Opinion has clarified the issues in 
this debate.136 The Court found (by eleven votes to three) that there was no 
specific prohibition of nuclear weapons, the majority taking the view that the 
General Assembly resolutions were insufficient to create a rule of customary 
international law in view of the strong opposition and contrary practice of a 
significant number of States.137 The Court also rejected the argument that 
nuclear weapons were covered by the prohibitions on chemical weapons or 
poisoned weapons. The Court found that the various treaties on chemical and 
biological weapons had "each been adopted in its own context and for its own 
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reasons" and concluded that the prohibition of other weapons of mass 
destruction did not imply the prohibition of nuclear weapons, while the ban on 
poisoned weapons had never been understood by States to apply to nuclear 
weapons. us 
Given the Court's conclusions on these points (which, it is submitted, are 
manifestly correct), the Court necessarily concentrated on the application to 
nuclear weapons of the general principles. The Court referred, in particular, to 
the prohibition of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, the 
prohibition of attacks upon civilians and of the use of indiscriminate methods 
and means of warfare, and the principle protecting neutral States from 
incursions onto their territory. Although the Court noted that the use of 
nuclear weapons was "scarcely reconcilable" with respect for these principles, it 
concluded that it did not have: 
[S]ufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of 
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of 
law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstancep9 
This passage suggests that the Court should therefore have concluded that the 
use of nuclear weapons was not unlawful in all circumstances. In fact, however, 
it adopted, by seven votes to seven on the casting vote of the President, the 
following conclusion: 
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of 
fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance 
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.l40 
The Opinion is not easy to follow at this point. In the absence of a specific 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the only basis upon which the Court 
could have concluded, consistently with its own earlier reasoning, that such 
use was illegal in all circumstances would have been by analyzing the 
circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used and then applying the 
principles of humanitarian law which were relevant. At the heart of any such 
analysis would have been three questions. 
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• Would the use of a nuclear weapon in the particular circumstances inflict 
unnecessary suffering upon combatants? 
• Would the use of a nuclear weapon in the particular circumstances be 
directed against civilians or indiscriminate, or, even if directed against a 
military target, be likely to cause disproportionate civilian casualties ? 
• Would the use of a nuclear weapon in the particular circumstances be 
likely to cause disproportionate harmful effects to a neutral State? 
To answer those questions would have required both a factual appreciation of 
the capabilities of the weapon being used and the circumstances of its use and a 
value judgement about whether the adverse consequences of that use were 
"unnecessary" or "disproportionate" when balanced against the military goals 
which the State using the nuclear weapon was seeking to achieve. 
The Court did not, however, attempt that task but merely enumerated the 
relevant principles, with little discussion, before reaching the conclusions 
quoted above.141 It is not clear, therefore, how it arrived at its conclusion that 
the use of nuclear weapons would "generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict," nor, indeed, what it meant by 
the term "generally" in this context. It is clear, both from the voting on 
paragraph 2E of the dispositif and from some of the separate and dissenting 
opinions, that there was a considerable divergence of views within the Court. 
Nevertheless, if one looks at the Opinion as a whole, the only interpretation 
of the first part of paragraph 2E which can be reconciled with the reasoning of 
the Court is that, even without the qualification in the second part of the 
paragraph, the Court was not saying that the use of nuclear weapons would be 
contrary to the law of armed conflict in all cases. It could only have reached 
such a conclusion if it had found that there were no circumstances in which 
nuclear weapons could be used without causing unnecessary suffering, striking 
civilians and military targets indiscriminately (or with excessive civilian 
casualties), or causing disproportionate damage to neutral States. The Court 
did not make such an analysis, and the reasoning gives no hint that it reached 
such a conclusion. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could have done so. In 
considering the application of principles of such generality to the use of 
weapons in an indefinite variety of circumstances, the Court could not have 
determined that as a matter oflaw a nuclear weapon could not be used without 
violating one or more of those principles,142 even if some of its members 
suspected as a matter of fact that that was so. 
This reading of the Opinion is reinforced by the fact that there is only one 
other basis upon which the second part of paragraph 2E of the dispositif could 
make sense. That is that, although the use of nuclear weapons would always be 
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contrary to the law of armed conflict, the Court was not prepared to exclude 
the possibility that there might be circumstances in which the right of a State to 
self,defense could override the prohibition imposed by the law of armed 
conflict. Although that interpretation has received a measure of support,143 it 
flies in the face of the long established principle that the law of armed conflict 
applies equally to both sides in a conflict. To hold that the party exercising the 
right of self,defense can depart from fundamental principles of the law of armed 
conflict would drive a coach and horses through that principle.144 
The Court's Opinion has attracted an enormous amount of interest among 
academic commentators. It is a mark of the ambiguity of the Opinion in general 
and of paragraph 2E in particular, that some commentators have seen it as 
largely vindicating the position of the nuclear,weapons States, while others 
have claimed it as a victory for the anti, nuclear lobby.145 The present writer 
finds the analysis of the first group the more persuasive. 
V. The Applicability to Weaponry of Other Rules of International Law 
It is tempting to take the view that once States resort to the use of force, the 
law of armed conflict, as lex specialis, takes over from all other parts of 
international law. On this view, the use of methods and means of warfare is 
governed exclusively by the law of weaponry. In practice, however, that law 
does not operate in isolation and the rest of international law cannot be 
disregarded in determining whether the use of a particular weapon is lawful. 
Three other areas of international law, all of which were considered by the 
International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, are potentially relevant. 
First, it has sometimes been suggested that the use of particular weapons, 
especially nuclear weapons, would violate the right to life under human rights 
treaties.146 The United Nations Human Rights Committee, for example, has 
commented that "the designing, testing,- manufacture, possession and 
deployment of nuclear weapons are amongst the greatest threats to the right 
to life which confront mankind today.,,147 However, warfare invariably 
involves the taking of life and it is clear that the human rights treaties were 
not intended to outlaw all military action even in self,defense. By prohibiting 
the arbitrary taking of life, Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the comparable provisions in other human 
rights treaties, imply that not all taking of life is prohibited. The travau.x 
preparatoires of Article 6 make clear that, in the context of warfare, the term 
"arbitrary" was intended to mean the taking of life in circumstances which 
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were contrary to the law of armed conflict, and killing in the course of a "lawful 
act of war" was expressly given as an example of a taking of life that would not 
be arbitrary.148 
This was the view taken by the International Court ofJustice in the Nuclear 
Weapons case. The Court accepted that the protection of the International 
Covenant (and, by implication, other human rights treaties) did not cease in 
time of armed conflict but held that: 
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict, which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a 
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be 
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, 
can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not 
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.149 
This conclusion, though no doubt unwelcome to some human rights 
lawyers, is plainly correct in view both of State practice and the travaux 
preparatoires of the Covenant. Nevertheless, the Court's acceptance that 
human rights treaties continue to apply in time of war (except insofar as 
derogation is expressly permitted) may be of considerable importance in other 
cases. Although the right to life may add nothing to international 
humanitarian law at the substantive level, human rights treaties contain 
unique mechanisms for enforcement which may be of great assistance to 
individuals seeking to rely upon the right to life in order to show that there has 
been a violation of the law of armed conflict. ISO 
Secondly, it has been suggested, again primarily in relation to nuclear 
weapons, that international environmental law is applicable to the use of 
weapons.1S1 In the Nuclear Weapons case, the Court stated that "the issue is not 
whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are 
not applicable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations 
stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total restraint 
during military conflict."lS2 It rejected the argument that the use of nuclear 
weapons was prohibited as such by the general environmental treaties or by 
customary environmentallaw.1s3 It would have been extraordinary for the 
Court to have concluded that nuclear weapon States, which had so carefully 
ensured that treaties on weaponry and the law of armed conflict did not outlaw 
the use of nuclear weapons, had relinquished any possibility of their use by 
becoming parties to more general environmental agreements. Nevertheless, 
the Court indicated that the international law on the environment does not 
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altogether cease to apply once an armed conflict breaks out, and it seems that it 
found the origins of what it identified as a customary law duty of regard for the 
environment in times of war154 as much in the general law on the environment 
as in the specific provisions of the law of armed conflict. 
Finally, the Nuclear Weapons case confirms that: 
A threat or use offorce by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, 
paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the 
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful. 155 
This proposition was not contested by any of the States which submitted 
arguments to the Court. 
The Court held that the right of self,defense under Article 51 of the Charter 
was subject to the limitations of proportionality and necessity which it had 
earlier held, in the Nicaragua case,156 were part of the right of self-defense at 
customary international law .157 It also concluded that, although neither Article 
2(4) nor Article 51 refers to specific weapons, the need to ensure that a use of 
force in self,defense was proportionate had implications for the degree of force 
and, consequently, for the weaponry which a State might lawfully use. The 
proportionality requirement of self,defense thus had an effect upon the legality 
of the way in which a State conducted hostilities. In determining whether the 
use of a particular weapon in a given case was lawful, it was therefore necessary 
to look at both international humanitarian law and the requirements of the 
right of self,defense. 
The Court's opinion on this point is of considerable importance. The logic 
of the Charter and customary law provisions on self,defense means that the 
modemjus ad bellum cannot be regarded as literally a "law on going to war," 
the importance of which fades into the background once the fighting has 
started and the jus in bello comes into operation. ISS The jus ad bellum imposes 
an additional level of constraint upon a State's conduct of hostilities, 
affecting, for example, its choice of weapons and targets and the area of 
conflict. The Court did not, however, accept, as some commentators had 
argued, that the use of nuclear weapons could never be a proportionate 
measure of self-defense.159 In reaching this conclusion, it appears to have 
accepted that proportionality has to be assessed, as Judge Higgins put it, by 
considering "what is proportionate to repelling the attack" and not treated as 
"a requirement of symmetry between the mode of the initial attack and the 
mode of response."160 
It is evident, therefore, that the legality of the methods and means of warfare 
can no longer be considered by reference to the law of weaponry alone. 
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Especially when one considers the more destructive weapons, the law of the 
United Nations Charter will be a significant factor to be borne in mind. Human 
rights law and international environmental law may also have some 
importance, although their application is likely to have only a small impact on 
the substantive law applicable to the use of particular weapons. 
VI. The Future of the Law of Weaponry 
This stocktaking of the law of weaponry at the end of the twentieth century 
shows that this part of the law of armed conflict, while not one of the most 
effective, cannot be disregarded as an anachronism. The adoption of new 
treaties on weapons of real military significance, such as chemical weapons and 
land mines, demonstrates that it is possible to develop legal regimes which, if 
they are made to function properly, can have a significant impact in protecting 
the values of humanitarian law. Similarly, the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons, whatever its shortcomings, shows that the general principles of the 
law are capable of developing in such a way that they can be applied to new 
types of How then is the law likely to evolve as we enter the new 
millennium? 
The outline of two developments is already visible. First, the trend of 
extending the law of weaponry from international'armed conflicts to conflicts 
within States is likely to prove irreversible. Application to such conflicts has 
already been the subject of express provision in the two latest agreements on 
land mines and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, the logic of 
the position taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in the Took case and the general trend towards the development of 
the law of internal conflicts means that most, if not all, of the law of weaponry is 
likely to become applicable in internal conflicts in time. There is every reason 
why this should be so. While arguments against extending parts of the law of 
international armed conflicts, such as those which create the special status of 
prisoners of war, to internal hostilities have some force, there is no compelling 
argument for accepting that a government may use weapons against its own 
citizens which it is forbidden to use against an international adversary, even in 
an extreme case of national self,defense. 
Secondly, it seems probable that the concept of penal sanctions for those 
who violate the law of weaponry will become far more important in the future. 
The Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1997 Land Mines Convention 
both make express provision for the enactment of criminal sanctions.161 
Certain violations of the principle of distinction are included in the grave 
219 
The Law of Weaponry 
breaches regime by Additional Protocol I, Article 85. Moreover, any serious 
violation of the laws of war is already a war crime and this would include a 
serious violation of one of the weaponry treaties or a general principle such as 
that prohibiting unnecessary suffering. However, the existence of the two ad 
hoc criminal tribunals and the development of their jurisprudence, together 
with the likelihood of a future permanent international criminal court with an 
extensive war crimes jurisdiction, means that these sanctions are likely to be far 
more significant in the future. How far this is a desirable development is 
another matter. While the present writer strongly supports the principle of 
effective criminal sanctions for violations of the law of armed conflict, it has 
been seen that the general principles of the law of weaponry-and, indeed, 
some of the specific provisions-are far from clear or easy to apply. It would be 
quite wrong to hold individual servicemen, especially low down the chain of 
command, criminally responsible for the good faith use of weapons with which 
their government has provided them. Moreover, the preparatory talks on the 
international criminal court have shown a disturbing tendency to try to use the 
negotiation of the Court's statute as a way of revising the substantive law on 
weaponry, thus risking upsetting the work of more specialized conferences. 
It is less easy to speculate as to what weapons might be made the subject of 
new agreements for the prohibition or limitation of their use. Incendiary 
weapons, fuel,air explosives, and napalm have all attracted considerable 
opprobrium over the last part of the twentieth century and are likely to face 
further calls for their limitation or outright prohibition. The precedent of the 
campaign against land mines, which attracted far greater publicity than do 
most developments in the law of armed conflict, suggests that future calls for 
changes in the law of weaponry may come as much from NGOs and public 
opinion as from governments. Such a change is both desirable and in keeping 
with the spirit of the Martens Clause. It carries the danger, however, that some 
of these calls will be unrealistic both in failing to recognize that States must be 
able to defend themselves and in the expectations which they create about 
what can be achieved. 
One of the most important issues is likely to be the future of nuclear 
weapons. The inconclusive Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
included a unanimous finding that: 
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in aU its aspects under strict and 
effective international controI.162 
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Although this paragraph adds little of substance to the 
Treaty, it has already led to calls for fresh negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament. In this writer's view, attempts to achieve a ban on the use of 
nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future and would 
probably prove in that they will block progress in other 
areas (as happened with attempts to reform the law of armed conflict in the 
1950's). As far as the possession of nuclear weapons is concerned, a ban is likely 
to prove possible only if all the States (declared and 
undeclared) support it, and such a result could not be achieved without 
simultaneous progress on a range of related security issues. 
One of the most important developments may well prove to be the 
application to new types of weaponry of the existing general principles. The 
AdvisOry Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case has demonstrated that these 
principles are capable of being applied to weapons of a kind which was beyond 
contemplation when those principles were first developed. The flexibility of 
the general principles thus makes them of broader application than the specific 
provisions which are all too easily overtaken by new technology. If the speed of 
change in military technology continues into the next century (as seems almost 
inevitable),163 that capacity to adapt is going to be ever more important. 
Take one example. Suppose that it became possible for a State to cause 
havoc to an enemy through the application of electronic measures or the 
selective planting of computer viruses which brought to a standstill whole 
computer systems and the infrastructure which depended upon them. Such a 
method of warfare would appear to be wholly outside the scope of the existing 
law. Yet that is not really so. The application of those measures, though not 
necessarily an "attack" within the meaning of Additional Protocol I because no 
violence need be involved,164 is still likely to affect the civilian population and 
possibly to cause great damage and even loss of life amongst that population. 
As such, it should be subject to the same principles of distinction and 
proportionality considered above. 
The application of the general principles of such forms of warfare would, 
however, require a measure of refinement of those principles. The place in the 
concept of proportionality which should be given to indirect, less immediate 
harm to the civilian population would have to be resolved. Similarly, if the 
principle of distinction is to be applied to existing, let alone new, weapons of 
naval warfare, a clearer assessment needs to be made of exactly what 
constitutes a legitimate target in naval hostilities. Both the military and 
humanitarian aspects of the unnecessary suffering principle need to be clarified 
if that principle is to have a significant impact in the assessment of new 
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methods and means of warfare. The duty which States have to scrutinize 
developments in weaponry and to assess whether any new weapons or methods 
of warfare comply with the law165 means that the resolution of such questions is 
a matter of considerable importance. 
In this writer's opinion, it is both more probable and more desirable that the 
law will develop in this evolutionary way than by any radical change. With the 
law of weaponry, as with most of the law of armed conflict, the most important 
humanitarian gain would come not from the adoption of new law but the 
effective implementation of the law that we have. That should be the priority 
for the next century. 
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161. See Chemical \Veapons Convention, supra note 6, art. VII. For an example of national 
implementation, see the United Kingdom's Chemical Weapons Act 1996. 
162. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 3, para. 105, part 2 (F) • 
163. See HEISBOURG, THE FUTURE OF WARFARE (1998). 
164. Additional Protocol I, supra note 26, at art. 49(1). 
165. This duty is expressly stated in Additional Protocol I, Article 36, butis regarded as part 
of customary international law. The United States of America, for example, which is not a party 
to Additional Protocol I, has long had a scrutiny program of this kind. 
231 
